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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
THE INTENT ELEMENT IN STATUTORY CRIMES
The philosophy of the common law was that no act would constitute
a crime if the element of criminal intent was lacking.'
To constitute crime there must not, only be the act, but also the criminal
intention, and these must concur, the latter being equally essential with the
former. Actus non reum facit, sed mens is a maxim of the common law.2
At common law it was ordinarily necessary that the criminal intent
be alleged and proved. 3 It appears obvious that any society which has,
as its basis, a belief in the freedom of the human will, and the resultant
ability of normal individuals to choose between right and wrong, would
incorporate the notion of the intent element into its criminal juris-
prudence. The history of the common law shows that the doctrine
requiring a consideration of the mental element in crime gained un-
qualified acceptance. Such a doctrine has a natural appeal to man's sense
of justice. Furthermore, it is a doctrine most consistent with the
philosophy of individualism prevalent in the United States. Hence, it
became a fundamental and immutable principle that unless a man's in-
tention was evil, his act was not guilty.4 This principle, as could be
expected, did not remain undisputed. There came into being a few
exceptions. 5
Life could not be expected to remain as simple as it was in the early
days of the common law, and, as society became more complex, the
lawmaking bodies saw the need for enacting statutes to modify the
requisites for common law crimes, to clarify or strengthen them, and
to create criminal laws to combat the new and varied situations which
necessarily arise with civilization's progrcss.6 With the advent of numerous
statutory crimes, the necessity of criminal intent was cast in doubt.
Criminal intent has still been held to be essential in some statutory
crimes, 7 while in others it has been held to play no part in the con-
1People v. Fernow, 286 111. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919); Kilboume v. State, 84 Ohio
St. 477, 95 N.E. 824 (1911); Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278 (1910); Common-
wealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910); State v. Kinkead, 57 Conn. 173, 17
Ati. 855 (1889); Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141 (1878).
2 Stokes v. New York, 53 N.Y. 164, 179 (1873).
3 Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910).
4 State v. Kinkead, 57 Conn. 173, 17 At. 855 (1889).
5 The following exam les illustrate the well-known exceptions: rape, where the
girl was not of the age otconsent; involuntary manslaughter and other crimes of neg-
ligence or omission. Cf. Commonwcalth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E. 2d 902
(1944).
( Examples of such statutcs are those pertaining to food, drugs, intoxicating liquors,
narcotics, etc.
7 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); Seaboard Oil Co. v. Cunningham,
51 F. 2d 321 (C.A. 5th, 1931), cert. denied 284 U.S. 657 (1931); State v. Hefflin, 338
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viction for the breach of a statute8 or ordinance.9 In an early American
case, it was stated that:
Nothing in law is more incontestable than that, with respect to statutory
offenses, the maxim that crime proceeds only from a criminal mind does not
universally apply. The cases are almost without number that vouch for this.t 0
That Congress and the legislatures of the several states have the power
and authority to create statutory crimes, and, in so doing, to dispense
with the need for the element of criminal intent, is generally conceded."
Criminal intent is, ordinarily, an element of crime, and this is true although
the offense is purely statutory. It is competent, however, for the Legislature
to make certain acts coupled with certain facts, offenses, punishable by fine
and imprisonment, without regard to the actor's actual knowledge of the
existence of the facts. 1 2
If it is the apparent intention of the legislature to make the act itself
constitute the crime, without regard to the good motives of the doer
of the act, the court must give effect to it.1 3 Such legislation has already
been enacted, 14 and it appears that more will follow in the future.
The constitutionality of this type of legislation is generally sustained
on the grounds of necessity." The fact that no criminal intent need be
Mo. 236, 89 S.W. 2d 938 (1936); Burnan v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 410, 15 S.V. 2d
256 (1929); People v. Connors, 253 Ill. 266, 97 N.E. 643 (1912); Crawford v. Joslyn,
83 Vt. 361, 76 Atd. 108 (1910).
8 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Hargrove v. United States, 67 F. 2d
820 (C.A. 5th, 1933); United States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476 (D.C. Ark., 1950);
Elliot v. People, 115 Colo. 382, 174 P. 2d 500 (1946); State v. Manos, 179 S.C. 45, 183
S.E. 582 (1936); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 272 Mass. 100, 172 N.E. 114 (1930);
State v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 848, 110 So. 522 (1926); People v. MeClennegen, 195 Cal.
445, 234 Pac. 91 (1925); State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838 (1922); State v.
Dombroski, 145 Mintn. 278, 176 N.W. 985 (1920); State v. Ryan, 70 N.H. 196, 46 Atl.
49 (1900); State v. Huff, 89 Me. 521, 36 Atl. 1000 (1897).
9 City of Hays v. Schueler, 107 Kan. 635, 193 Pac. 311 (1920); Commonwealth v.
Closson, 229 Mass. 329, 118 N.E. 653 (1918).
10 Halsted v. State, 41 N.J.L. 552, 589 (S. Ct., 1879).
11 Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910); State v. Shedoudy, 45
N.M. 516, 118 P. 2d 280 (1941); Borderland Construction Co. v. State, 49 Ariz. 523,
68 P. 2d 207 (1937); Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934);
People v. Cramer, 247 Mich, 127, 225 N.W. 595 (1929); People v. McClennegen, 195
Cal. 445, 234 Pac. 91 1(925); People v. Fernow, 286 IlI. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919); Mills
v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278 (1910); Satte v. Zichfeld, 23 Ncv. 304, 46 Pac. 802 (1896).
12 People v. Rice, 161 Mich. 657, 664, 126 N.V. 981, 984 (1910).
13 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); State v. Fulco, 194 La. 545, 194 So. 14
(1940); State v. Gaetano, 96 Conn. 306, 114 Atl. 82 (1921); State v. Cox, 91 Ore. 518,
179 Pac. 575 (1919).
14 Note 6 supra.
15 People v. Fernow, 286 I11. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919); Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51
So. 278 (1910); People v. Rice, 161 Mich. 657, 126 N.V. 981 (1910).
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shown in order to convict the doer of the forbidden act does not render
the statute unconstitutional as being a deprivation of "due process" under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.16
Sometimes criminal intent is expressly made a part of the statute, 17
and in such case no difficulty arises. The problem of statutory con-
struction becomes perplexing when no mention of the intent element
is made.
Whether criminal intent is an element of statutory crime is exceed-
ingly important in view of the consequences which follow from the
unconcious performance of the forbidden act. Where a specific intent
is expressly required by the statute, it must be alleged and proved in
order to obtain a conviction.18 Conversely, where criminal intent is
not a requisite of the statutory crime, it is of no consequence whether
the defendant acted with the best of motives, or whether he acted in the
bona fide belief that he was obeying the law. 19
It is important, therefore, to determine whether some criteria exists
which can be applied to ascertain whether the necessity for criminal
intent can be assumed in a statutory crime where such intent is not
expressly made a requisite. Referring to this very proposition, the United
States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Morissette v. United States,'20
said:
Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken
to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing
between crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We
attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is neither settled nor
static. 21
The difficulty in setting up a criteria for distinguishing between statutory
crimes that require a criminal intent and those which do not arises
from a conflict of two cardinal considerations which are diametrically
opposed to each other, and which, by their very essence, cause unrest
in the minds of judges who are called upon to decide this issue. There
is, on the one hand, the abhorrence with which civilized people view
the punishing of unconcious violations of the law, and the natural in-
16 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,
218 U.S. 57 (1910).
17 State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E. 2d 313 (1936); State v. Thomas, 127 La.
576, 53 So. 868 (1910); People v. Welch, 71 Mich. 548, 39 N.W. 747 (1888).
18 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St.
27, 1 I.E. 2d 313 (1936); People v. Fernow, 286 111. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919).
19 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); State v. Manos, 179 S.C. 45, 183 S.E.
582 (1936); State v. Hennessey, 114 Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211 (1921); Commonwealth v.
Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910).
20 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
21 Ibid., at 260.
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justice which flows from such a system. Thus, in an early Connecticut
case,22 it was held that the unconcious violation of a statute forbidding
the driving of carriages on Sunday subjected the violator to no liability.
There was no mention of intent in the statute; nevertheless, the court
held that the defendant's act was not within the spirit of the law. The
reasoning of the opposite school of thought, has been expounded in
a Michigan case,23 in which it was said:
Section 1 of the act 24 prohibits in positive terms the sale of intoxicating
liquors, and no language is used which indicates that the element of intent
is to be read into it. Had the Legislature intended to make the intent to violate
the law an essential element, it would have doubtless used some appropriate
language indicating its purpose. If it were necessary to prove intent to violate
the law before a convicton could be had, the act would fall far short of doing
what the Legislature obviously intended it should do; and presumably in this
can be found the chief reason why it did not incorporate into the act the ele-
ment of intent. Laws forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors and impure
foods would be of little use, if convictions for their violations were to depend
on showing guilty knowledge. 25
It is apparent that the basis of this school of thought is the necessity of
protecting society through the police power of the state, and the prac-
ticality of enforcing the laws directed toward that end.2 6 Probably one
of the best examples of the conflict between these two schools of thought,
involves the construction of statutes regulating the sale of intoxicating
liquors. Some courts require an intent element,27 while other courts
dispense with it.28
It is to be noted, in the Michigan case, that the court relies heavily on
the intent of the legislature as the basis for its construction of the
statute. The common law rule for construing statutes has been applied
as a general test in determining whether criminal intent is essential to
the commission of the statutory offense:
While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary
element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed
in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in
terms include it . . . there has been a modification of this view in respect to
22 Myers against The State of Connecticut, 1 Conn. 502 (1814).
23 People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333, 140 N.W. 648 (1913).
24 Mich. Pub. Laws (1899) No. 183.
25 People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333, 335, 140 N.W. 648, 649 (1913).
26 People v. Crammer, 247 Mich. 127, 225 N.W. 595 (1929); People v. Fernow, 286
111. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919); Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 51 So. 278 (1910).
27People v. Rice, 161 Mich. 657, 126 N.W. 981 (1910); Mulread v. State, 107 Ind.
62, 7 N.E. 884 (1886).
28 Feeley v. United States, 236 Fed. 903 (C.A. 8th, 1916); People v. Sybisloo, 216
Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 410 (1920); State v. Kinkead, 57 Conn. 173, 17 Ad. 855 (1889);
Farmer v. People, 77 1M. 322 (1875).
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prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such
a requirement. It is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the
court.
2 9
Actually this is but an illusory test in a great number of instances, for
if the legislative intent could be readily ascertained, there would be no
problem. In those statutes where the legislative intent is clearly reflected,
the courts must give effect to it.30 However, in those cases where the
legislative intent is not so clear, an attempt should be made to discover
what the lawmaker's intent was, since it is always the important factor
in determining whether scienter should be incorporated into the language
of the statute.
In those cases where the statute codifies a common law crime, or in
which common law terms are used, it is generally assumed that the
legislature intended that a provision for intent be incorporated into
the statute even though this is not expressly done.3" Where no mention
is made as to whether intent is necessary, and no common law terms
are used, it has been held that there is a presumption that the legislature
intended there to be a requirement of criminal intent. 32
As a general rule where an act is prohibited and made punishable by statute
only, the statute is to be construed in the light of the common law and the
existence of a criminal intent is to be regarded as essential, even when not
in terms required.33
However, there are cases which hold that unless intent is expressly
required by. the statute, it does not have to be alleged and proved.3 4
Such courts will not indulge in any presumption of an intent requirement.
The view also has been taken in some cases that where the act is
merely malhn prohibituw, criminal intent is not necessary.3" A similar
result was reached where the statute was merely in aid of the police
power of the state, although the statute made no mention of criminal
intent.30 Consequently, the distinction between those crimes which are
maluw in se and those malum prohibitun may serve as another factor
29 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922).
30 Burnan v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 410, 15 S.V. 2d 256 (1929); Birney v. Ohio,
8 Ohio 230 (1837); Neidlinger v. State, 17 Ga. App. 811, 88 S.E. 687 (1916).
31 State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 118 P. 2d 280 (1941); State v. Hefflin, 338 Mo.
236, 89 SA. 2d 938 (1936); Knecht v. Kenyon, 179 Wis. 523, 192 N.V. 82 (1923).
32 Knecht v. Kenyon, 179 Wis. 523, 192 N.XV. 82 (1923).
33 Ibid. 34 Note 18 supra.
35 Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); Hargrove v. United
States, 67 F. 2d 820 (C.A. 5th, 1933); State v. Fulco, 149 La. 545, 149 So. 14 (1940);
People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 410 (1920); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 139
Pa. 247, 21 Atl. 10 (1891).
36 Duncan v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 231, 158 S.W. 2d 396 (1942); State v. Strig-
gles, 202 Iowa 1318, 210 N.XV. 137 (1926); State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 Pac. 107
(1920); People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 627, 122 N.E. 155 (1919).
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to be considered in determining whether the intent element is required.31
However, the distinction between crimes malm in se and malwm pro-
hibitum is not a clearly defined one. There is a twilight zone wherein
the classification becomes doubtful, and where forceful arguments may
be presented on both sides of the question.
One thing appears certain-that the appearance or lack of appearance
of the word "knowingly," or its equivalent, in a statute is not conclusive
on the question of whether the statute requires criminal intent.38 It has
been held that the performance of the forbidden acts must be voluntary
and, as such, they are intentional, although not criminally so. 39 Thus,
in a case involving a statute prohibiting bigamy, a man who had an
honest belief that his wife was dead, entertained on reasonable grounds,
and who voluntarily remarried just prior to the expiration of the time
necessary to raise a legal presumption of death, was held guilty on the
ground that his voluntary act of remarriage was the only intent required
to be shown.40
Some courts, in construing the word "knowingly" in a statute, con-
sider it to mean "intentionally." In such jurisdictions, the doer of the
act must have knowledge of its illegality.41 On the other hand, those
courts which adhere to the other trend of thought, construe the word
"knowingly," or its equivalent, to mean that the doer of the act must
have such knowledge of the essential facts so as to allow the law to
indulge in a presumption that he also had a knowledge of its legal
consequences. 42
In any event, the logical and equitable guarantee that the legislature can
not do away with the necessity of criminal intent in all cases, exists. There
are limitations to its power to eradicate the intent element, even in crimes
which are merely malum probibitum. It has been held that, in spite of the
general rule that the legislature may penalize the doing of an act without
regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer, a law which would punish
a man for the commission of an act which the utmost care on his part
would not enable him to avoid, and would be valid.43 Also, in State v.
37 Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F. 2d 478 (C.A. 10th, 1951).
8 State v. Gaetano, 96 Conn. 306, 114 Atl. 82 (1921).
39 State v. Fulco, 194 La. 545, 194 So. 14 (1940); State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190
Pac. 107 (1920); Pappas v. State, 135 Tenn. 499, 188 S.W. 52 (1916); State v. McLean,
121 N.C. 589, 28 S.E. 140 (1897).
40 State v. Ackerly, 79 Va. 69, 64 Atl. 450 (1906).
41 Hargrove v. United States, 67 F. 2d 820 (C.A. 5th, 1933); Crawford v. Joslyn, 83
Vt. 361, 76 Atl. 108 (1910).
42 People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 410 (1920); Crawford v. Joslyn, 83 Vt.
361, 76 Atl. 108 (1910).
43 State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922), rehearing denied 103 Ore.
443, 206 Pac. 290 (1922); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).
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Strasburg,44 is was held that a statute which expressly declared that in-
sanity would no longer be a defense to crime was unconstitutional under
the Washington Constitution 45 which, in substance, provides that no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.
The United States Supreme Court was undoubtedly correct in saying
that there seems to be no one, true test for determining whether the intent
element should be included in a statutory offense that does not expressly
provide for it. 46 As has been shown, the legislative intent should generally
be the controling factor. Also, the subject matter and the purpose the
statute is designed to accomplish may be another factor. It has been sug-
gested that an examination of the probable results that the various construc-
tions might effect may be useful. 47 Whether the statute is a codification of
a common law crime or makes use of common law terms is also to be con-
sidered, as is the distinction between crimes maiwn in se and malum pro-
hibitun.
There can be no doubt that, for public protection, certain acts should be
made criminal without regard to the intent element. Generally, the penalty
for the breach of such a statute is comparatively light. Also, the violators
of statutes of this class usually receive little, if any, social condemnation.
Nevertheless, if we are to preserve our concepts of freedom and individual
rights, the intent element must always hold a position of importance in
our criminal jurisprudence. Perhaps it is vell to bear in mind an observa-
tion made by Justice Holmes: ".. even a dog distinguishes between be-
ing stumbled over and being kicked."4 8
4460 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).
45 Article 1.
46 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
47 State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958 (1922), rehearing denied 103 Ore.
443, 206 Pac. 290 (1922).
48 Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1881).
